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Abstract.  - This  paper  interprets  case  studies  and  theory  on  community  involvement  in
beneficiary selection and benefit delivery for social safety nets.  Several considerations should be
carefully balanced in assessing the advantages of using community groups as targeting agents.
First, benefits from utilizing local information and social capital may be eroded by costly rent-
seeking.  Second, the potential improvement in targeting criteria from incorporating local notions
of deprivation must be tempered by the possibility of program capture by local elites, and by the
possibility that local preferences are not pro-poor.  Third, performance may be undermined by
unforeseen  strategic  targeting  by  local  communities  in  response  to  national  funding  and
evaluation criteria, or by declines in political support.
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Social safety  nets can serve an important  role in alleviating  poverty  and in promoting  long-term
growth  by providing  households  with the protection  that markets  and informal  networks  may  not
supply. A social  safety  net may  redistribute  resources  toward  disadvantaged  groups,  or sustain
political  coalitions  to support  critical structural  reforms. Unfortunately,  the growing  awareness  of the
importance  social  safety nets in developing  countries  has not been translated  into  effective  action
because  of the failure of traditional  social  welfare  ministries  to effectively  reach  and engage  the poor.
This has led  to experimentation  with new bottom-up  service  delivery options  and poverty  alleviation
mechanisms  that more actively  involve  the poor and their communities  in program  design,
implementation  and monitoring. Examples  include  reforms  that decentralize  the delivery  of public
services  to local governments,  community  management  of forests  and other natural  resources,  and
group-based  microcredit  programs.  Demand-driven  social  funds that aim by design  to elicit
community  involvement  have become  increasingly  popular  with governments  and donors,  and
international  organizations  such  as the World  Bank now make community  participation  an explicit
criterion  for funding  approval  for a growing  list of piojects (World  Bank 1996,  World  Food  Program
1998).
Common  sense  and substantial  evidence  suggest  that community  participation  can lead  to
improved  project  performance  and better targeting  (Baland  and Platteau  (1996),  La Ferrara  (1999),
Narayan  et al. (1997),  Wade  (1988),  Isham  et al. (1995)). For example,  a study  of India's  Integrated
Rural  Development  Project  found  that Indian  states  which employed  village  councils  to select
beneficiaries  had a much smaller  proportion  of non-poor  participating  households  (Copesake  1992).
A large  recent survey  of dozens  of country  experiences  with social safety  nets conducted  by Subbarao
et al. (1997,  p. 87) for the World  Bank contends  that programs  that involve  communities,  local
groups,  and NGOs  can achieve  better targeting  outcomes.
The purpose  of this paper is to review  evidence  and to propose  a framework  for thinking  aboutthe community-based targeting mechanisms to deliverprivate  benefits, i.e. mechanisms that target
welfare or relief'  For the purposes of this review, we define community-based targeting as a state
policy of contracting with community groups or intermediary agents to have them carm, out one or
more of thefollowing  activities: 1) identify recipientsfor cash or in-kind benefits, 2) monitor the
delivery of those benefits, and/or 3) engage in some part of the delivery process.
Community agents can be social or religious groups, single-purpose NGOs, or local elected
officials or governing bodies.  The extent to which an agent qualifies or not as a community agent
depends on that agent's level of embeddedness in local community affairs.  By this we mean the
degree of involvement of the group or functionary in other functions and activities that imbricate that
agent in poor sub-communities, or the degree of involvement in day-to-day community life of the
poor (through residence, leisure, private business). Throughout the paper we will often treat
community groups and intermediary agents as coterminous, and apply the single label 'community
agents'.
Several advantages might be expected from community-based targeting.  There may be lower
costs of administration through better cost sharing and faster setup where other administrative
structures are weak or non-existent.  Involving community groups as stakeholders may lead to better
screening, monitoring and accountability.  Community groups may have better information for
identification of needs, and households may in turn have less incentive or opportunitv to provide false
information on assets, income or shocks.  Local definitions of deprivation may be more adaptable to
local conditions and culture than rigid technical national formulas.  Programs may not only harness
'Many useful  lessons  can be drawn  from existing  studies  of community  participation  in programs  where
project  benefits  are shared  such  as social  funds,  the decentralized  provision  of local public  goods (Narayan  and
Ebbe 1997,  Reddy  1998),  or community  management  of natural  resources  (Agrawal  and Gibson  1999,  Baland
and Platteau  1996,  Leach,  Meams  and Scoones  1999).  However,  the program  design  and  political
considerations  that  arise in targeting  private benefits  are sufficiently  distinct  as to merit  their own separate
review. Harnessing  community  participation  to manage  a common  forest  area, to deliver  a local public  good
such as a health  clinic, or to maintain  a collective  reputation  vis-a-vis  a micro-credit  program,  are all activities
where  the participants  are at the same  time beneficiaries  and intermediaries.  When  delivering  cash  or in  kind
benefits  however,  the intermediary  and  the beneficiary  are typically  no longer  the same  (and indeed  may  have
quite  different  interests)  and so a different  set of incentives  must be provided.
2but may potentially also strengthen social capital and community organizations, with positive external
effects.  This may be especially true for the disadvantaged groups who may be empowered in by
becoming better able to articulate and press demands.  Community mobilization may be an end in
itself, but may also confer legitimacy to programs that in turn helps build political support for targeted
approaches.
Despite these advantages, there are several reasons to question the practicality or wisdom of
community-based targeting in some settings. Amongst other problems, community-based targeting
may lead to, or increase conflict and divisions within the community; it may impose high opportunity
costs on community leaders, it may be subverted to serve elite interests, and like any other
decentralized welfare program, it may fail to take account of important externalities across
communities (such as differential benefits leading to population movements) or could undermine
political support for targeted approaches.
This paper, an interpretative review of the literature, will explore just how well communities
might use local informnation  and social capital to allocate new program resources toward the poor and
vulnierabie. We first briefly present several examples of community-based targeting schemes.  We
follow this with an outline of many of the most important effects and options in constructing a
community-based targeting scheme.  The remaining three sections focus on what appear to be the
major tradeoffs in the public policy choice of community-based targeting.  First, will community-
based targeting 'increase the size of the cake'?  In other words, will community mechanisms be
effective at lowering the costs of delivering benefits to a target population? Second, what size slice of
cake will the poor obtain? That is, what kinds of distributions are likely to emerge when community-
based targeting is employed after taking into account the need to provide incentives, program leakage,
and the rents that intermediary agents could potentially capture?  Also, under devolution local
targeting preferences, determined through local political processes, might differ substantially from
national preferences or those of a donor.  Finally, what will determine the cake-making 'ingredients'
available to community-based agents for disbursal to eligible recipients? Here we focus on the
3national-level political economy and program design issues that arise while implementing a
decentralized policy of community-based targeting.
We conclude with some observations about how to design a community-based targeting scheme.
Current experiments have tended to use homogeneous community agents across the country to
implement targeting - for example, local town mayors in every poor community.  But agents that
would empower the poor and be responsive to poor constituencies are unlikely to be homogeneous
across countries, and so a more demand-driven approach to community-based targeting may be
recommended in some cases.  We also believe that in many instances the best community-based
targeting schemes will be hybrid mechanisms where the center defines and monitors targeting
categories, rather than unconditional devolution to community groups with little basis lor evaluation
or control.
Examples of Community-Based Targeting
There are several modem and historical examples of purposeful large-scale community based
targeting for social safety nets. 2 Arguably one of the earliest and most studied examples of a
community-based targeting mechanism was the English system of poor relief. For several hundred
years until the reforms of 1834, the English poor laws implemented a highly decentralized system of
poor relief administered and financed by local parishes.  Although the parish began as a local church
institution, by the sixteenth century the estimated 12,000-15,000 parishes in England had assumed
many of the functions of local civil government including the administration of poor relief.  Each
parish was responsible for deciding who was unable to work and deserving of relief, and for financing
and delivering relief.  The following account from the diary of Thomas Turner (1754-1765) describes
2 A simple  but persuasive  illustration  of how much difference  the choice  of community  agent  can make  for
ultimate  targeting  outcomes  comes  from  the study  of intra-household  resource  allocation  (Kanbur  and  Haddad
(1992)). As countless  poverty  alleviation  programs  have  discovered,  and many  empirical  studies  confirm,  the
decision  to deliver  assistance  via a female  parent  typically  leads  to a larger  positive  impact  on child welfare  and
household  investments  in health,  nutrition  and education  than delivering  the same  resources  via a father.  Thus
the use  of categorical  targeting  of women  may be thought  of as a form of community  based  targeting  where
children  are the ultimate  beneficiaries.
4how poor relief decisions were made in his day (cited in (Mencher 1967)):
The parishioners were accustomed to meet once a week at the parish workhouse, at which
meetings all applicants for relief were received and where all laborers belonging to the parish,
who had not in the preceding week been in constant employment, attended to give an account of
their earnings and received such sums as, with the earnings, should amount to a sum deemed
competent to their maintenance in proportion to their children.
The rising poverty and the significant externalities that naturally arose in a locally financed
system of poor relief meant that the system became increasingly difficult to manage, especially
through the upheavals associated with the industrial revolution and the enclosure movement. This
then fostered incentives for restrictions on population movement; no parish wanted an influx of poor
persons.  Brown and Oates (1987), in fact, cite the experience of the Poor Laws and this externality as
an example of the presumption for centralizing poverty alleviation programs.  Eventually, a rate-
payers revolt and changing political tides led to the Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834 which greatly
reduced relief and imposed the onerous workhouse test.  The reforms led to a much more centrally
administered system based on uniform rules (Quigley 1999).
Another historical example of community-based targeting comes from colonial experience.  The
language of Indirect Rule -- the use of 'Native Authorities' by the French and British to administer-
their African (and other) colonies -- is replete with references to the advantages of community
intermediation.  Indirect Rulers (chiefs, sheikhs and emirs) were supposed to be more accountable to
their 'subjects', to know more about their needs, and were definitely cheaper than expatriate
administrators.  Delegation of responsibility for targeting benefits was common.  For example, during
scarcity-situations in World War II the British used Native Authorities in western Sudan to ration
sugar, tea, petrol and other commodities.
The need to build an entirely new safety net and the search for new intermediary agents has been
especially important in transition economies, such as in Uzbekistan, Albania, Armenia and China.  In
these countries private safety nets and community organization had been displaced or weakened by a
long history of state action, yet far-reaching economic reforms have brought about an abrupt end to
5the existing workplace-centered social assistance programs.  In these contexts an important case for
building a social safety net from the ground up, employing new community intermediaries rather than
state bureaucrats, is to encourage new self-help initiatives and organizations to break a tradition of
looking for solutions from an outside state apparatus.
In 1994 the Uzbek govemment began an experiment to involve quasi-official, quasi-religious
community groups known as mahallas in the decentralized targeting of child benefits and other types
of social assistance to low-income families.  The mahallas, traditionally acted to mediate community
problems and conflicts. A unique aspect of the program is that the State has given local mahallas
considerable discretion in deciding whether a family should receive assistance and the amount.
External reviews of the program suggest benefits were targeted relatively well (Coudouel, Marnie and
Micklewright 1998).
In Albania, when faced by massive unemployment and poverty in a transition period in the early
nineties, the Ndihme Ekonomika (economic support) safety net was implemented to provide benefits
to poor rural households and families that lost jobs.  The central government at first administered
grants bureaucratically through local ministry offices but found that this formula provided little
incentive for local officials to verify eligibility requirements, so the program was then devolved to
local governments (communes) using a system of block grants.  Using data from a recent household
survey, Alderman (1998, 1999) found local targeting effectiveness compared quite favorably with
safety net programs in other low-income countries although he notes that overall targeting
performance could be improved by a better targeting of block grants across localities.
In Armenia, chronic public sector financing problems and low pay for doctors and teachers has
meant that health and education had become de-facto fee-for-service programs, even before user fees
and charges were explicitly set.  Parents of children enrolled in public schools have been paying for
food, for instruction that falls outside the core curriculum, and for fees for textbook. Social
assessments suggest that this type of fee acts as a barrier to access to the poor (World Bank 1999, pg.
667).  To respond to the problem the government established a school textbook waiver program.  The
government allocates a fixed amount to each school in an amount sufficient to waive annual textbook
rental fees for 10 percent of students.  The remaining 90 percent of funds required are to be raised by
charging parents a rental fee of approximately US$1 for each textbook their child uses.  The decision
as to which students will be exempted is in some cases made by the school principal, in others by the
school parent-teacher association (World Bank 1999, pp. 67-68).
In China, local communities have been responsible for providing assistance to the needy, or so-
called "Five Guarantee" households.  Under a new 1985 law "local autonomy was granted in standard
setting and financing, with the central government only concerning itself with statutory grants to
martyrs, disabled soldiers, and incapacitated veterans in institutions (Wong 1994, p. 318)."  The
legislation was perhaps not as significant as one might think however.  Urban welfare benefits
obtained though employers were by many accounts lavish, but rural benefits negligible.  Rural
welfare programs use community-based targeting, but state funds distributed this way have been
limited (to around 1.7% of the state budget over the period 1950-91 according to Wong (pg. 316).  As
migration to cities has increased in recent years, urban neighborhood committees have taken on
increased responsibilities for providing informal welfare services, but the level of benefits remains
low (Johnson 1999).
Finally, the Programa Nacional de Solidaridad in Mexico (PRONASOL), initiated under
President Salinas in 1988 combined aspects of a social fund with benefit delivery (specifically in the
form of scholarships for needy children and some subsidization of basic foods, though many of the
public goods investments have also been seen as public employment schemes). Locally elected
Community Solidarity Committees and Municipal Solidarity Committees were supposed to be at the
core of these programs.  Opinions and research on the operations of Pronasol vary widely, and are
often based on scanty, anecdotal evidence and simple and perhaps flawed methodologies. Few
commentators have been very positive about the program. Trejo and Jones (1998, p. 92) conclude
7that, "the decentralization of poverty resources to states with autocratic structures will most likely
result in the perpetuation of extreme poverty and the fortification of the PRI's monopoly on power."
While the cases described above differ greatly in terms of scale and the purposefulness of their
design, a common element in each of these programs is the selection of established community agents
who are then given significant discretion to decide on how to target new resources.
Community-Based  Targeting: Preliminary Conceptual Issues
The design of any social service or benefit delivery program is of necessity shaped by the
informational asymmetries involved in determining beneficiary eligibility, and in monitoring the
welfare agents whose task it is to determrine  eligibility.  While a social safety net could in theory be
administered via a single central income tax office that would make transfers based on self-reported
income or other household or individual attributes, in practice all programs rely on welfare agents to
assess eligibility and deliver benefits.  The reason is obvious: even in industrialized countries where
the income tax base is broad, self-reported data is not very reliable, and a welfare program generates
incentives for dissimulation.  Given the cost and difficulty of audits, benefit eligibility tends to be
conditioned on personal or household characteristics or 'tags' that are thought to be less manipulable
and easy to ascertain by welfare agents, such as employment status, age, gender, and number of
dependents (Akerlof 1978, Besley and Coate 1995, Boadway and Keen 1999).
In developing countries where income tax systems are often weak or non-existent, and where
information asymmetries can be severe, tagging is an even more important device for targeting social
spending. Not surprisingly then, a good part of the large and still fast-growing literature on targeted
spending in developing countries has focused on topics such as the cost effectiveness and
performance of different broad targeting methods and proxy indicators, on how program design
features affect the incentives of potential recipient households and individuals to reveal information
or supply labor effort, and on the political economy of support for targeted interventions. Recent
8surveys of the literature include Grosh (1994), Rashid and Townsend (1994), Besley and Kanbur
(1993), van de Walle (1995). Comparatively little attention has been devoted however to analyzing
the proper choice of intermediary agent to determine beneficiary eligibility and deliver benefits, or the
incentives they should face. A few recent exceptions such as Boadway (1997),  Bardhan and
Mookherjee (1998) and Abraham and Platteau (2000) are discussed below.
A Taxonomy of Targeting Mechanisms and Methods
We employ the term targeting method to refer to the set of rules, criteria and other elements of
program design that define beneficiary eligibility.  The broader term targeting mechanism is used to
refer to the larger elements of program design, including the very important question of the choice of
intermediary agents and organizational design.  These definitions allow for the possibility that
different intermediary agents using the same targeting methods could obtain different targeting
results.
Applying these distinctions, Table I builds upon Grosh's (1994, pg. 34) taxonomy of targeting
methods.  The three main targeting methods employed in practice are: individual assessment, tagging
or categorical targeting, and self-targeting.  Table I augments this classification by distinguishing
between mechanisms that employ centralized bureaucracies to deliver benefits from mechanisms that
engage community groups as intermediaries, and according to whether or not the mechanism is used
to target private benefits or local public goods and services.
Individual assessment mechanisms require program agents to decide eligibility on a case-by-case
basis.  This may involve a direct means test, proxy means test, and/or subjective evaluation by a
social worker (Glewwe 1992, Ravallion and Sen 1994). Tagging, or categorical targeting offers
eligibility to all members of a group defined by an easily identifiable characteristic or trait.  This
includes geographic targeting (Baker and Grosh 1994, Bigman, Dercon, Guillaume and Lambotte
1998) and the restriction of benefits to identifiable social groups such as single women with children,
9ethnic groups, or the elderly (Appleton and Collier 1995, Buvinic and Geeta 1997, Case and Deaton
1998, Cornelius 1995). Finally, self-targeting methods take advantage of differences in participation
costs across households to get non-target households to self-exclude.  Examples include employment
guarantee schemes with low wages and price subsidies for inferior good items (Besley and Kanbur
1991, Blackorby and Donaldson 1988, Jacoby 1997, Munro 1992, 1992).
Community-based targeting is not a separate targeting method, but rather part of a mechanism
that places community agents in charge of assessing eligibility and/or implementing delivery.  An
agent or local institution's preferences and values and the time and effort they exert will crucial for
determnining  the quality of the tag and therefore targeting outcomes and costs of a giver method, and,
depending on the degree of devolution, may even determine the local method of targeting.
Delegation versus Devolution
At the heart of the mechanism design problem is a judgment regarding the relative importance of
delegation versus devolution.  A center or principal delegates responsibility for candidate selection
and benefit delivery to local community groups when the principal tries to contract to use the better
information and access to local networks of a delegated intermediary agent in order to carry out the
principal's objectives.  Imperfect monitoring and the fact that local agents may have different welfare
criteria gives rise to the possibility of moral hazard: by the center's criteria localities might misdirect
or misuse resources.  By way of contrast, when the center devolves responsibility to local
communities, it transfers not only resources but also responsibility for setting the criteria by which
eligibility and assistance level will be judged.  We cannot then so clearly speak of moral hazard, nor
can we assess program performance without first specifying by whose criteria the program is to be
evaluated.
Complete devolution is not very common in practice except for the case of fully autonomous
regions.  Most community based targeting mechanisms provide local communities a variable amount
of discretion within a set of rules and regulations.
10Schematics of the political economy of community-based targeting
With these preliminaries  in mind, we may now set forth a stylized timeline or model that captures
many of the tradeoffs and expected behavioral responses involved in the design and operation of
community-based targeting mechanisms. The government starts by announcing a policy. This is a
contract or menu of contracts specifying what the local community group is to do, which groups are
eligible to compete for contracts, the choice of intermediary agents, beneficiary selection criteria, and
a longer-term funding formula based in part on pre-defined evaluation methodology.  Coalitions the
form in communities to create new groups or to obtain power in existing groups and then vie for
contracts.  Resources are used and social capital is changed in the process. Population movements
may occur.  Government then allocates funds to intermediary agents, who in turn allocate funds
within their communities, in ways possibly unanticipated and unspecified in the original contract.
Government and civil society monitor and evaluate new levels of well-being and other outcomes.
Community groups, bureaucrats, IFIs, policy advisers and political entrepreneurs, the press, and
population lobby government and electorate.  Finally, government implements new policy.
The design challenge is to choose the mechanism that best achieves the welfare objectives of the
program designers while taking into account the constraints imposed by the possible strategic
responses of households, intermediary agents and other stakeholders to the policy and to each other,
and how these responses lead to new group formation, population movement, lobbying, etc.
The framework glosses over several complications.  First and foremost it begs the prior
normative question of whose welfare criterion should maximized.  A genuine commitment to
community participation would weigh local community criteria much more heavily than the center's
objectives, but the center may well be reluctant to allow full discretion in the setting of program
objectives and eligibility criteria, and this may lead to the choice of a more centralized delivery
mechanism, and/or to stricter rules, guidelines governing local community choices.
11Second, an important concern in the design of any safety net program, regardless of the targeting
mechanism, is the extent to which state policy might crowd-out or displace existing private safety net
programs (Cox (1995), Subbarao (1997)).  Third, a more dynamic view would address such questions
as how policy and community actions might evolve as the economy changes over time. and what
policy rules the government might adopt when responding to foreseen and unforeseen contingencies
(i.e. does the government commit not to finance cost overruns or to bail out failed contracts?).
Fourth, the government has a further layer of decision in determining at what geographic scale to
locate the community, and indeed defining community in the first place.  In fact, the very notion of
'community'  sometimes glibly employed in the literature demands greater scrutiny.  Communities are
often discussed as if they were well-defined geographic entities, as opposed to geographically
overlapping ethnic or religious entities. 3  Harragin and Chol (1999) describe the serious problems
that international famine relief agencies in Southern Sudan recently encountered when they attempted
to build a community based distribution network by using chiefs of traditional grazing groups as
intermediaries, rather than the more natural (but to outsiders, less apparent) kin-based networks via
which existing local safety net had been managed.  A related point is that communities may not
always exist at large enough geographic scales for cost-effective delegation.  Inevitably.,  program
officers themselves will become involved in the creation of artificial community institutions and
boundaries.
Despite these omissions, the framework highlights several important tradeoffs.  For instance, if
communities are to be specified along geographic criteria (i.e. according to residence), and residents
3 Many  purported  'communities'  may in fact not be communities  at all (in the sense  of sharing  a common
set of values  or even  sharing  common  problems  and  resources). Olivier  de Sardan  (1999)  is particularly  blunt
on this point  and is worth  quoting  at length  (see  also Sharpe  (1998  pg. 31)): "In numerous  regions  of Africa,
despite  appearances,  there is no village  property,  or any equivalent  of the former  'communal  holdings'  of rural
European  societies.  If such  holdings  do have 'proprietors'  or 'masters',  who act in  the interests  of a 'group',  these
'groups'  are usually  private  ones,  so to speak,  claiming  their rights against  other  groups  of the same  village,  by
asserting  their own  supremacy:  the lineage  of the descendants  of the first settlers,  or the founders  of the well,  or
the first  conquerors,  or the last  conquerors,  or the first  chiefs  of the colonial  administration,  or the last chiefs  of
the independence  administration,  and so forth. Village  infrastructures  are not usually  'communal'  or public,
even if their  usage  happens  to be public  (and  though  there are strong  moral  constraints  goveming  their
12of different regions have different preferences or different interests, then the resulting variety in
community targeting criteria may lead to large movements of population.  Also, depending on how
competition between community groups seeking contracts and participation is structured, resources
could be either used up in wasteful rent-seeking or, preferably, new social capital might be created
which improves the performance of local governments in other functions. We turn now to a more
detailed discussion of some of the important tradeoffs.
Increasing  the Size of the Cake: How Cost-effective is CBT?
A growing literature has established that community involvement can lead to improved project
performance in social funds, microcredit projects, natural resources management, public health, and
in local public goods provision.  But community involvement is not always and everywhere the
optimal policy.  In managing small irrigation facilities in India, for instance, the pendulum has swung
from state management to local management and in some cases back again to state management
(Baker 1997). There are simply no automatic guarantees that a community group or agent who lives
and interacts with the local population, will perform better than a bureaucrat, across the range of
measures of performance.
What exactly might make a community agent more cost-effective at identifying beneficiaries and
monitoring and delivering benefits?  In other words, how does this mechanism make 'the cake' larger
by lowering administrative costs and mobilizing local resources that might otherwise have remained
idle or engaged in less productive uses?  What characterizes localities or local agent that could not be
reproduced by central government?  Could not central state employees living in the locality perform
as well as community agents? Obviously, relocated state employees might need higher salaries than
local implementers or community groups, but such persons might be more educated and effective in
managing funds than local agents.
accessibility)."
13The sources of advantages seem to be three: better information, better enforcement, and more
positive spillovers.  These advantages may come at a cost however: the superior abilities of local
agents may generate rents that divert resources away from the target group, or worse yet, may create
costly rent-seeking activities that drain other community resources.
Better information
Local community agents often have better information on household characteristics, needs and
recent events upon which to condition beneficiary eligibility than do outside welfare agents who must
often rely on crude and outdated proxy indicators (Cremer, Estache and Seabright 1996). Better
information allows for fewer targeting errors of inclusion or exclusion.  Better information may also
greatly reduce administration costs and total deadweight loss compared to programs administered by
less informed welfare agents who must rely on screening and monitoring devices such as costly audits
and indirect incentive systems that place constraints on the amount and types of benefits delivered.
Local community groups may or may not consist of agents who have superior information about
each other and who are enmeshed in dense local social structures of accountability. Even if they do,
it is not always apparent how to make this resource operational.  For example, a study of group
informant food security ratings in Honduras questions the reliability of using community ratings as a
guide to policy ((Bergeron, Morris and Banegas 1998))(Bergeron, Morris and Banegas 1998). The
main concern was that when different randomly selected sub-groups of community members were
asked to arrive at community wealth and vulnerability rankings the authors discovered a fairly weak
correspondence between the rankings.  Based on this and other evidence they conclude that the
method of group informant ratings is at best a useful complement rather than an alternative to other
assessment approaches.
Hoddinott (1999) raises similar concerns in a review of targeting methods for food security and
Abraham and Platteau (2000) discuss a number of reasons for why local information flows may be
limited and local informants may be reluctant to provide information to outsiders. Rai (2000)
14approaches the issue theoretically, arguing that mechanisms designed to get community members to
truthfully reveal information about others are vulnerable to collusion, particularly under a soft budget
constraint. However Adams et al. (1997) found that group ratings in Bangladesh were quite consistent
with rankings arrived at through proxy means indicators constructed from a much more expensive
household survey. A recent survey of the use of participatory poverty assessments in World Bank
projects is provided in Robb (1999).
Useful Local Social Capital to Control Corruption
Local community agents will also be imbricated in extensive and dense locals networks of social
interaction. Such overlapping ties of actors may reduce the cost of cooperation and coordination. If
we think of the allocation of benefits as the outcome of an ongoing game between local intermediary
agents and members of the community, the more the agent overlaps with local community members
who might retaliate in other dimensions of social interaction, the less likely the agent is to 'cheat' any
one dimension.  In other words, local social capital, or local structures of accountability, can make a
difference.
If we follow Spagnolo (1999) in thinking of social capital as the degree to which agents are
enmeshed in other kinds of social interactions that rely on cooperation and coordination, then it is
easy to see why many authors have emphasized a connection between social capital and
accountability and also view open political competition as a form of social capital. The basic idea
again is that if performance in one arena is closely linked to outcomes in other arenas, such as multi-
issue local politics, cooperation and accountability are more likely.  Of course, a dark side to social
capital has also been pointed out.
Whether or not political competition will lead to efficient program implementation is however an
open theoretical and empirical question  (Coate and Morris 1995)4 The Chicago school tradition of
4 In the text below  we discuss  the separate  but related  issue  of whether  and  how well elected  local officials
will represent  the interests  of the most  poor and vulnerable  in their  communities.  Here the focus  is on whether
15Stigler and Becker (Wittman 1989) suggests that political competition should lead to efficiency in the
delivery of targeted transfers, otherwise politicians would be voted out of office (much like
consumers might switch to the lower price provider of a good).  In contrast the Virginia school of
Tullock and others maintains that politicians often find 'sneaky' and wasteful ways to redistribute,
usually because of a serious lack of competition, misinformed voters or high transaction costs
(Wittman 1989).5
Many researchers argue that variation in community effectiveness is tied to variation in social
capital (Brown and Ashman 1996, Collier  1998). Studies of local or international variation in social
capital and the effects on performance tend to confirm the basic hypothesis of close correlation
between the two measures.  Putnam (1993) finds that measures of social capital vary svstematically
between northern and southern Italy, and account for some of the effectiveness of local bureaucracies.
Selden and You (1997) and Wang (1997) suggest that in China, where reforms are creating
representative and empowered village structures, electoral competition promotes the enhancement of
local capacity that will be more effective in implementing state-local contracts.  Studies from Latin
America (Fiszbein 1997, Herzer and Pirez 1991, L6pez Murphy and Inter-American Development
Bank. 1995, Nickson  1995, Peterson 1997, Veltmeyer 1997) reach similar conclusions.  Electoral
competition is not the only institutional prerequisite for responsiveness and effective targeting
however.  An econometric study of World Bank projects carried out by Isham, Kaufman and Pritchett
(1997) found that there was also a strong link between civil liberties and project performance even
after controlling for other factors affecting performance. They suggest the causality runs from civil
liberties to citizen voice and accountability to economic performance.
local  political  competition  can keep  local agents from  becoming  corrupt.
Seabright  (1996)  offers  a slightly  different  perspective  in his model  of incomplete  contracts,  suggesting
that when  the goals of targeting  are poorly  defined  and  non-contractible,  a bureaucrat  will have little
accountability.  His or her superior  will not have the information  to evaluate  performance,  and a national
electorate  may be too diffuse  to discipline  the ruling government.  Decentralization  (or devolution,  properly
speaking),  on the other hand,  offers  the natural  mechanism  of local voting  to discipline  the agent.
16Generating Social Capital
By raising the rewards to participation, programs could perhaps not only harness but also
strengthen social capital and community organizations, with positive external effects. Particularly in
countries coming out of central planning, a history of state action has often displaced private and
informal coping mechanisms and safety nets.  In these countries the hope is that community based
targeting mechanisms may help to crowd-in rather than crowd-out new civic society groups and
private safety nets.
The idea that outside funding could build community is often discussed in the context of local
public goods projects.  The idea is that by granting communities 'ownership' over new local public
goods projects, and/or by insisting on community co-financing requirements, incentives can be
generated for members to mobilize private energies, resources and vigilance, for the common good.
There is considerable anecdotal evidence that community-based targeting does increase local social
capital.  Fox (1996) reports how, in indigenous communities in Mexico, waves of decentralization in
provision of public goods and services, followed by crackdowns and reassertions of control,
nevertheless expanded the reach and capacity of local social institutions.
A recent study by Gugerty and Kremer et al. (1999) paints a more complicated picture however.
When community-organized and funded schools and self-help groups in Kenya (Harembee) received
additional outside support in randomized trials, there was little evidence of an increase in measured
social capital, as captured by a number of different indicators. If anything, there was some evidence
that groups that received funds responded by acting to more clearly define who was and was not
eligible for benefits.  Those excluded or who stopped attending group meetings were typically behind
on paying contributions toward group membership, and this most likely suggests that targeting toward
the poor did not improve.
Rent Seeking
As previously noted, the superior information and monitoring technologies in the hands of a
17local internediary  means that there are potential information rents to be captured.  Program design
may be able to limit the level of rent capture, for example by establishing competitive bidding for
contracts or by a system that assures local political accountability.  But as new and existing
community groups compete for control of available rents, they may also end up spending real
resources that then offset the benefits of the program.  Political markets fail when the outcome of
local political processes is costly rent-seeking.
Given the absence or weakness of community institutions in many localities, a program of
community-based targeting changes the incentives for political entrepreneurs to create new
institutions.  In order to create the appearance of participation entrepreneurs might use spend
resources to build community centers, hold rallies, and mobilize showcase labor intensive activities.
Some cynics view the rapid rise of NGOs around the world, as little more than an opportunistic
response by downsized bureaucrats, and entailing no real new participation or local empowerment
(Bebbington 1997, Bebbington and Sotomayor 1998, Meyer 1995, Reilly 1998).
Slicing the Cake: What Kind of Distribution Might Result?
Community agents may be in a position to employ more socially desirable, or locally adapted,
criteria for assessing need.  On the other hand, the community agent may be in a better position to
,capture' the program and direct resources away from intended beneficiaries. The distribution of
rents, and intended benefits, will vary greatly across communities because of variation in the
distribution of local preferences and ability of local groups to influence local political processes.
Community Preference and their Aggregation
Local communities sometimes share broad principles of social justice and deservirigness that
influence the level of willing support for safety nets and targeted benefits.  Davies (1968), Peterson
and Rom (1990) and Wolpert (1993) argue that variation in local preferences is responsible for much
of the variation in safety nets across localities in industrial countries. King (1997, 1997) also believes
18that there was considerable variation in local preferences for relief in England during the time of the
Poor Laws.  In China, Chan, Madsen and Unger (1992, p. 189) report that in Chen village during the
1960s, "though production teams were required by law to provide food, shelter, clothing and a coffin
for any needy childless elderly, the amount was a pittance, providing only for the barest subsistence.
Other team members looked down upon such welfare recipients as a drain on the production team's
resources. To grow old without a son's financial support was a humiliating and frightening prospect."
More likely than broad agreement is differences of opinion, regarding eligibility and
deservingness, among members of a community.  Individual preferences are aggregated into local
social preferences by the particular political process at work in each local context.  There are few
theoretical or empirical generalizations that can be made about how heterogeneous preferences are
aggregated.  Existing models of political competition do not generate clear results. In some analyses
more poor persons generates more votes for redistribution while, under slightly different assumptions,
more poor persons may generate more intense resistance to redistributive taxation by the middle and
upper class (Peterson and Rom 1990, p. 53).
Capture and Exclusion
Preferences may be aggregated through open, participatory democratic processes, or through less
open and more manipulable ones.  The term 'capture'  has come to denote situations where economic
power can be used to influence political outcomes through manipulation of information or
perceptions.  The term runs the range of electoral or political practices, from ballot-rigging and other
illegal manipulations, to vote buying and use of 'big money' to cynically sway the voting behavior of
naive voters, to ideologies that grant different 'rights of participation'  to different members of a
community even though all may be citizens and formally of equal status.  The issue is complicated,
because capture may have the effect of changing the formal mechanisms themselves.  In a study of
community heterogeneity and inequality in rural villages in Tanzania, La Ferrara (1999), found that
higher inequality is associated with less democratic forms of group decision making.
19Bardhan and Mooherjee (1999) analyze the factors that might determine whether under political
competition capture by elites is more likely to occur at the local or national level.  Capture at different
levels of government then determines the targeting impact of expenditure decentralization reforms.
They argue that local capture is more likely the higher is income inequality and the less mobilized
(informed) are voters at the local level.  They warn however that generalizations on the basis of
theory alone are hazardous.  Abraham and Platteau (2000) are rather skeptical about the potential
benefits of devolving social programs in many existing communities, noting that "rather than idyllic
village democracies," they are often in fact,  "repressive societies where mutual control is constantly
exercised, suspicions are continuously entertained about others'  intentions, inter-personal conflicts
are pervasive, and a rigid rank-based hierarchical structure governs people's life (pp. 20)."
Unfortunately, the empirical literature on the matter is also far from settled.  Anecdotal evidence
abounds. 6 Scheffel's (1999) discussion of Roma (gypsies) in a Slovakian village is illustrative.
Benefits were distributed by both central and local government (the latter consisting of local village
council representing the dominant Gadjo majority).  The council denied the Roma access to village
land for housing.  Ironically, the central government requirement that they be members of a village in
order to acquire benefits exacerbated local tensions.  Many Roma would have left the inhospitable
village if they had not been tied to a locality in order to receive benefits.
In India, Echeverri-Gent (1992) suggests that 1978 electoral reforms which allowed new
political parties to compete in local elections in West Bengal resulted in better pro-poor targeting of
rural employment programs, after poverty alleviation programs were devolved to the local, elected
governing councils (gram panchayat).  Fox (1999) has addressed differences between communities in
Chiapas compared with Oaxaca, arguing that local elites have captured programs in Chiapas but not
Oaxaca.
6 Baland and Platteau [1998a, 1998b, 1999] provide some interesting theoretical propositions, with
numerous  examples  of actual commons,  and conclude  that  there is little a priori  basis for  judging  the
effectiveness of community decision-making.
20The last few years have seen a number of econometric studies testing different methods for
measuring the degree of local capture of programs.  Lanjouw and Ravallion (1998) estimate the odds
of participation by income quintile for various public works projects in India.  There are large
differences between the average and marginal odds of participation.  If a program has high average
odds of rich quintile participation, but low marginal odds, then one might conclude that the program
is captured early on, and only after coverage of interested non-poor households does the program
spread to the poor.
Galasso and Ravallion (Galasso and Ravallion 2000)  obtain similar results with an examination
of Bangladesh's Food for Education program, which operated in several village in each of the
country's 400 districts (see also Wodon and Ravallion (2000)).  The villages were chosen by the
central Ministry in cooperation with district officials, but the actual targeting of beneficiary families
was left to the school committee in each village.  Families whose children continued to attend school
received substantial benefits in-kind.  Galasso and Ravallion find that greater inequality in the village
distribution of income reduced the incidence of the poor in receiving the targeted benefits.
La Ferrara (1999) finds that ethnic fractionalization in Tanzanian villages did not have much of
an impact on individual participation in community groups, while income inequality in the village did
have a significant effect.  Income inequality, moreover, was associated with poor performance of
groups and lower community trust.
Getting the Ingredients for Making  Cake: National-level Issues
The end result of a program to target resources through decentralized community-based targeting
is influenced not just by the cost advantages and the nature of local preferences and capture, but also
by national choices about funding.  National funding is in turn determined by at least three processes.
First, decentralized democratic political processes may tend to be less favorable to narrower targeting
(the 'paradox of targeting') and community targeting may result in co-optation from above and less
overall relief for the poor in the longer run.  Second, the financing modality of the national scheme, in
21terms of the rules for allocating funds across communities, may induce strategic targeting behavior by
the community agent.  Third, local targeting may lead to population movements.
The Paradoxes of Targeting
The literature on the political-economy of expenditure decentralization in developing countries is
in its infancy (see Treisman(1999) and Jones, Sanguinetti and Tomasi (2000) for recent models). The
few papers that do model the process in regards to poverty alleviation take as their starting point the
paradox of targeting.  Better targeting policy may well end up undercutting political support for social
spending programs (Perotti (1993), Benabou (2000), Sen (1995), Gelbach and Pritchett (1997), Van
de Walle (1995), deDonder and Hendricks (1998), Casamatta, Cremer and Pestieau (2000)).
Cremer and Palfrey (1996) point out an additional consideration in a simple model of
decentralization.  They abstract from incentive considerations, and focus on the issue of preference
aggregation.  If citizens have preferences over a policy (in this case targeting), and preferences are
aggregated via majority voting, then there are circumstances where citizens would prefer to have the
policy decision taken at the national or central level, rather than at a district level.  Citizens may be
worried that local majority preferences will differ considerably from their own.  Since national
preferences aggregate over all preferences, the median preference in the nation is less likely to be an
,extreme' preference.  Thus, while one might think that local decisions are better in that they respond
to local preferences, this may not be the case if there is wide dispersion of preferences within
localities.
The point, as far as targeting is concerned, is that national targeting may be an equilibrium
arising naturally out of a political process.  Attempts to alter that equilibrium may then meet with
considerable resistance, and may well be overturned. 7 Besley (1997:125) has pointed out that in an
7The  difficulties  in  planning  for these  national  political  economy  issues  were illustrated  at the recent
second  Micro-Credit  Summit.  An exchange  on the floor,  summarized  in the summit  newsletter,  went  as
follows:  "In discussing  a $105  million  World  Bank loan  to the Bangladesh  government  for PKSF,  [Ismail]
Serageldin  said,  'Autonomy  wasn't  easy  ...credit  to PKSF  was blocked  for about  seven  or eight months  because
the minister  of finance  insisted  that  they would  name  the head of the agency. Dr. Yunus  [of Grameen  Bank]
22equilibrium sense more effective performance by community groups need not translate into larger
benefits for the poor; the efficiency gains may be captured entirely by the government or wealthy
taxpayers.
Decentralization may also lead to competition and rent-seeking that may erode local capacity to
challenge national leadership.  Co-optation is the watchword here; Cleary (1997), for example, is
extremely critical of the possibility of NGO independence under authoritarian regimes.  A very
common concern in the literature is that, "as the voluntary/community sector becomes increasingly
involved in public-sector contracts to provide services...  the focus has to be upon those services ...
rather than upon broader 'watch-dog'-type function, let alone advocacy and campaigning functions..."
(Mayo and Craig 1995:8). A similar concern arises when community groups are more radical than
the government; for instance in many countries with large or predominant Muslim populations,
opposition Islamic groups have strategically developed large social service progranis (Clark 1995).
Governments then have been very careful in decentralizing authority over welfare.
There are numerous examples of occasions where administrative decentralization and devolution
of power was accompanied by the centralization of political power.  Under apartheid the South
African government took a number of initiatives with the stated objective of devolving power to local
governments.  Many observers interpreted this as a strategy to de-politicize the population, co-opt
local political leadership, and deflect popular protest from national to local levels (see Klugman
(1994:46)).  The military dictatorship in Chile devolved responsibilities for basic social services to
regional governments and municipalities at the same time that it was replacing once elected officials
with presidential appointees.  Quiroz et. al. (1997) suggest that decentralization was more about de-
politicization than empowerment.8  Finally, in China residents' committees and street offices are
and other  microfinanciers  said, 'No,' that  the board  had to name  the CEO  or else there  would  be no autonomy...
I am happy  to say  that  the World  Bank,  in fact, sided  with  the microfinanciers  and  as a result we do have  PKSF
and $105  million  went  there. But  there aren't  many  such examples."'
s Since democratization  in 1990  however,  government  has introduced  several  new approaches  to integrate
organized  community  groups  into  targeting  programs.  These include  making  local  governments  pay more
attention  to and be more  accountable  to local  neighborhood  committees,  and rewarding  community  group
23supposed  to provide  opportunities  for participation  but have been  criticized  as vehicles for a 'top
down'  approach  to development  aimed at garnering  support  for policies  handed  down from the center.
Allocating  Funds  to Communities  and CBT  Evaluation
Rules concerning  the amount  and form of financing  that community  agents should receive  for
disbursement  to the local poor are  at the heart of any community-based  targeting  scheme. Ravallion
(1999)  has argued  that any reasonable  formula  for funding  decentralized  community  groups  ought  to
incorporate  evaluation  results into  the formula. Thus formulas  should  incorporate  not just how  poor
the locality  is in relation  to other localities,  but also assessments  of how  past local targeting  efforts.
Evaluation  of community-based  targeting  by the center or outside  funding  agencies is likely  to
encounter  numerous  problems. One immediate  philosophical  concern  arises:  if the locality  and center
have  different  social  welfare  functions,  on what criteria is community-based  targeting  to be  judged,
the  center's  or the locality's? If local agents  can identify  the poor better  than conventional  survey
methods  or means-testing  because  it brings in intangible  elements  such  as capability  deprivation,
functioning,  status, access  to networks,  etc. (Sen 1995,  Sen 1984),  then evaluation  of targeting
according  to standard  criteria  may  suggest  it is not working. Villages  and communities  may  be much
more  concerned  with preserving  a sense of inclusiveness  (in terms of rich  and poor)  and much  more
willing  to exclude certain  segments  of the poor (always,  of course, on the  justification of
deservingness).  Finding  that many  of the poor  are excluded  and many  of the rich included  would
then be  judged to be poor targeting  by the national  standard  and excellent  targeting  by the local
standard.
Alderman  (1998)  discusses  the difficulties  of evaluation  in his study of local knoA  ledge  in the
community-based  Albanian  safety  net. He finds  that households  already  receiving  state pensions  are
less likely  to receive  additional  benefits,  but households  that receive  both pensions  and an additional
transfer  from local authorities  do not get  transfers  that are statistically  any smaller  than households
projects  through  social  fund  programs  such  as  FOSIS  (Graham  1994).
24without a state pension.  This may mean commune officials are privy to special circumstances of
households, but is also consistent with commune officials not knowing that households are receiving
pensions. As Alderman (1999) has succinctly phrased it, there is an "inherent irony" in the search for
more effective decentralized targeting mechanisms.  That irony is that while local community groups
do have better information about local conditions and preferences than the central government, unless
local bodies have incentives to truthfully reveal and act on that information, the center will remain
largely in the dark about the key decision of how to allocate resources across localities.
Ravallion (1998, 1998) develops a simple model showing that if localities work within a given
budget and optimally allocate services and benefits between the rich and poor, if given an extra dollar
to spend, poorer localities will pass on a smaller fraction of that dollar to the poor, in part because
they will be spending a larger fraction of their budget on the poor to start with.  The point is that
poorer localities may appear to be less effective at targeting than the richer communities not just
because of lack of capacity.  Ravallion tests this implication in a statistical analysis of targeting
performance in Argentina's  frabajar work program.  He concludes that, "the incentive to reach poor
areas within the province was duller for a poorer province," but the center took this into account and
allocated resources to provinces that were more effective in reaching poor areas (Ravallion 1998, pg.
22).  He suggests that the project selection criteria that the federal government has put in place was an
important complement to a system of allocating grants on the basis of a national poverty ranking.
Population Movements
Many community-based targeting programs will be small-scale, and so their behavioral effects
will be small. Larger programs will have bigger effects.  One concern is that because program
implementation will vary, population movements may follow; as the Chinese proverb has it, "water
flows lower, the poor flow higher."  The externality this creates across jurisdictions may invite
uncoordinated compensatory adjustments at the local level, particularly when local revenues are
25raised  (Cremer,  Estache  and  Seabright  1996).9  Population  movement  has been  an important  topic  in
debates  over decentralization  of the U.S.  safety  net, with  some  authors  arguing  that variability  in state
benefit  levels  generates  inefficient  incentives  to locate residence  (see Peterson  and  Rom  1990).  The
debate  over the magnitude  of the effects  of'welfare  magnets'  is by no means  settled,  however  as many
researchers  find no effects  or very  small effects  using U.S. data  (see  (Allard  1998, Cebula  and  Belton
1994, Enchautegui  1997,  Frey  1997, Frey, Liaw,  Xie and  Carlson  1996,  Schram,  Nitz  and  Krueger
1998, Schram  and  Krueger  1994)).
Although  inter-jurisdictional  extermalities  are  less of a concern  in a centrally  funded  safety  net
program,  community  agents  may be reluctant  to extend  safety  nets  to new migrants'(  Vlaenn (1999)
discusses  membership  and  exclusion  decisions  in agricultural  ejidos in southeastern  Mexico.  Forrnal
ejido members  imposed  conditions  for receiving  benefits,  ranging  from  access to village  land to
participation  in government  and NGO-sponsored  development  projects  upon migrants  fleeing  civil
war,  or marginalized  ejido members.  In one  case, indigenous  chola-speaking  refugees  requested
permission  to become  members  of a village  and agreed  to pay  an  entrance  fee, but then  waited  for two
years  before  becoming  finally  convinced  that their  admission  would  be vetoed  by the non-chola
speaking  faction  within  the ejido  who  feared  their  local  power  would  be undermined.  The refugees
were  denied  benefits  of the  village,  even  though  they were  clearly  the most  in need of benefits.
9In  fact, the English poor law administrators developed an extensive body of regulations, known the 'law
of settlements' that severely limited geographic movement between parishes and aimed to greatly further
stigmatize those who accepted relief.  Forty days witnessed residence without objection became the basic
criteria for eligibility but those in charge of poor relief would, of course, often object to residence of poor
persons, and send them back to their original parish.  This then led to systems of certificates, so that officials
could know where a person was originally from. Adam Smith, who became a vocal critic of the system,
exclaimed at the time that "there is scarce a poor man in England of forty years of age, I will venture to say,
who has not in some part of his life felt himself most cruelly oppressed by this ill-contrived law of settlements"
(Smith, American Imprint Collection (Library of Congress) and Marian S. Carson Collection (Library of
Congress) 1789, pp. 240-48).
'° Consider another angle on this same question, applied to peer-group microcredit programs.  It is argued
that many recent programs have succeed in achieving good repayment records because they use the poor
themselves as financial intermediaries, for example by using solidarity groups to encourage peer- selection and
monitoring . But both theory and evidence suggests that in forming groups, borrowers have no particular
incentive to choose poorer, more vulnerable partners.  To the contrary, some evidence suggests positive
assortative matching and a tendency to exclude poorer members (Ghatak and Guinnane 1999)
26Designing a Community-Based Targeting System
Most existing CBT schemes are homogeneous with uniform community entities and agents.
That is, the same agents are used across the breadth of the country.  The 'endgame'  for these
programs seems to be increased or eventual incorporation of community agents into the social welfare
bureaucracy.  Community-based targeting thus appears as a formula for rebuilding a bureaucratic
social safety net with a new bureaucracy.
Given our emphasis on community-based targeting as a potential method to empower
marginalized groups and encourage participation, it seems unlikely that a uniform program would
accomplish this goal effectively.  Especially in the absence of participatory democracy, municipalities
or uniform community entities are not likely to be appropriate purveyors of community demands as
they have already been captured by an undemocratic state.  Even in a participatory democracy, local
institutions respond to median voters. The paradox of targeting, now applied at the locality level,
suggests broader redistribution versus targeting.
To empower marginalized groups community-based targeting may need to incorporate some
of the lessons of the social fund approach, and adopt a demand-driven, menu approach that broadens
the diversity of participating community agents, perhaps using detailed and transparent public
consultations and analysis before decisions are taken regarding contracts with given community
groups."  The 'local community' to be considered could then include semi-formal or informal village
councils, school boards and mosques, organized NGOs, or perhaps ethnic groups and traditional
leaders, assisted perhaps by institutional organizers.  Depending on the context each of these
community institutions will vary in terms of their superior information, embeddedness in monitoring
institutions, willingness to engage in rent-seeking, and their propensity to be responsive to the poor.
Choosing amongst them is of course not an easy task, but Smoke and Lewis (1996) report on one
" Graham  (1995)  reports  wide variability  in social  funds,  with  some programs  (Zambia  and Chile)  doing
reasonably  well,  and others  doing  very poorly  (Senegal  and  Peru).  See also  Tendler  (2000)  Reddy  (1998)  and
Narayan  (1997).
27practical exercise to construct measures of capacity of local govemment  in Indonesia.
Moreover, if there is strong likelihood that dominant community groups will exclude weaker
groups, one possible way to target excluded groups is to explicitly use categorical targeting or quotas.
For example, in the state of Karnakata in India the composition of the mandal panchayat (group of
villages) reserves a quarter of all seats for women, and 18 percent for members of scheduled castes.
Vietnam seeks the adequate representation of poor peasants on the governing bodies of production
cooperatives by reserving two-thirds of the seats for low income groups (Majeres (1985;)  cited in
Klugman (1994  p48)).
The uninformed center's need to provide an intermediary agent with incentives may create a
tension between achieving good targeting and other program objectives.  The problem is that it is
usually easier to tie performance to easily measured and observed variables, such as the number of
clients attended, or the number of clients who find jobs, yet reward along these narrow dimensions
may provide incentives against reaching the poorest or most vulnerable, who may sometimes be the
most difficult to attend.  For example, loan staff at microlending organizations are often placed on
high powered incentive contracts which tie remuneration to repayment performance and some argue
that this dulls incentives to target poorer and more vulnerable residents.  Those microlending
organizations that have achieved relatively good targeting outcomes, such as Grameen Bank, seem to
have accomplished this in part by also insisting on categorical targeting, such as targeting women and
imposing wealth ceiling eligibility requirements (Conning (1999)).
The best community targeting outcomes are likely to be achieved within hybrid systems which
allow for significant local community agent discretion but also stipulate clear rules and targeting
guidelines and which keep local agents accountable through external auditing and evaluation, and
institutions such as mandatory public meetings, and competition among groups for contracts and
elected office.
28Conclusion
This review has highlighted four key points in discussing community-based targeting: (1)
communities vary in their ability to mobilize information and implement effective monitoring
systems, and this will influence whether community based targeting leads to cost saving advantages
or just opens up more opportunities for local-level corruption and costly rent-seeking; (2) local
communities will vary in their willingness to target the poor; (3) national political economy effects
are likely to be complex and may result in paradoxical undermining of safety nets; and (4) evaluation
and funding of community-based targeting poses several special conceptual problems.
Community based targeting is likely to offer advantages over other targeting mechanism when
communities can be clearly defined, say by region or social group.  One may want to avoid situations
where people are members of multiple communities, first to avoid double-dipping for benefits, but
also to avoid creating frictions within communities by forcing beneficiaries to choose among them in
terms of primary membership. To be cost-effective, community-based targeting may need to take
place at a large enough scale, but this is not always practical. Many tagged groups are often not
organized communities (for example women and widows).  Here creating community may be useful
and empowering, but is not a task easily accomplished.
Many, if not most of the examples of community based targeting involve a state contracting with
homogenous community entities on a national or regional scale.  But this suggests that community
based targeting is almost by definition a transitional phenomenon as the ultimate aim of most of these
programs seems to be to build a new social welfare bureaucracy with more responsive community
agents. While this should be the ultimate goal and is itself laudable, we have suggested that in some
cases, especially in those cases where an absence of democratic participation is likely, one may want
to experiment by encouraging heterogeneous community entities to compete to provide different
social safety services.
While local democratic participation is to be encouraged as a mechanism to insure greater
29transparency and accountability of local officials, leaving the decision over how to target and
redistribute funds to local voting is unlikely to guarantee targeting of the most vulnerable and under-
privileged groups.  If the existing 'community'  has already failed to make the existing flawed safety
net bureaucracy responsive to the needs of the most vulnerable, then why believe that same
community would target the most poor and vulnerable?
This perspective is brought out by Sen (1984; 1995), who has long argued that rather than focus
on income deprivation, poverty ought to be understood as a deprivation in a minimum acceptable set
of functionings.  These include not only basic physical functionings such as being well nourished,
having adequate clothing and shelter, or avoiding preventable disease, but also social functionings
such as being able to participate in the life of the community, to be in public without feeling shame,
etc.  The problems of social exclusion and entitlement failure that dictate and condition a person's
capability deprivation are often deeply rooted in local social divisions and the way the community
operates and regulates access to resources.
Changing these structures and breaking down social divisions often requires challenging
established structures and mobilizing the disadvantaged.  Building a more effective social safety net
will not just be a matter of finding better information or proxy indicators, but of opening valid and
lasting opportunities for participation through which the poor can establish and press for claims when
this becomes necessary.  The best community agents may be activists and entrepreneurs; people who
can engage the poor in the political process to obtain greater say and control over how community
resources are allocated to those in need.' 2 While this does require allowing for more local community
discretion in deciding resource allocations, carefully chosen national targeting rules, criteria and
national political support can help strengthen the position of disadvantaged groups in these local
contests.
1212 We recognize  of course  that  this type of intermediary  agent  - local  leaders  who are willing  and able to
challenge  existing  institutional  structures  -- may be in short supply  (see also  Tendler  (2000) and  Abraham  and
Platteau(2000)).
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Method  kind benefits  public goods  or kind benefits  public goods
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Individual  means-testing with  Variable access  means-testing  local club goods
assessment  questionnaires  fees  using local  boundary
deservingness  enforcement
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in-kind transfers,  employment  competitive  social fund projects
non-pecuniary  guarantee  grants for  (cofinancing
Self-selection  costs (stigma,  schemes (with  community  and other
waiting)  low wages)  groups  participation costs)
tagging by social  Women's  neighborhood
Categorical  characteristic  projects (for  Social exclusion  allocations,
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Geographic  family status) or  or eligible  zones (in the U.S.)
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